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 INTRODUCTION 
 A non-negligible fraction of human gestation has become professional-
ized. A sector of so-called “reproductive care” has fully emerged, whereby 
many wombs have entered the marketplace (Vora  2015 ; Pande 2015; 
Cooper and Waldby  2014 ; ICMR  2014 ). Far from stabilizing the mean-
ing of “normal” reproduction, however, the exponential rise in surrogacy 
services is visibly troubling the systems determining what is called “moth-
erhood”. By extension, surrogacy publicity “causes trouble for the social 
relations of production and reproduction, which such mystifi cation other-
wise normalizes and conceals. Our task as thinkers of surrogacy, I propose, 
is not merely to explain but to “stay with [that] trouble” (Haraway  2011 ). 
As gestation has become paid labor, performed by a worker for a wage, 
space has appeared for scrutinizing these categories anew: a challenge that 
heaves up root ideological assumptions about motherhood and family. 
The surrogate becomes a potential subject of political rupture. 
 To point to how such a politics might be escalated, and what it might 
have the power to do, in what follows, I will question the technocratic 
distinction between surrogacy and pregnancy proper, which clearly 
 naturalizes motherhood. The distinction, assumed to be self-evident, 
hinges on the downplaying of unromantic dimensions of pregnancy (such 
as pain and confl ict) and, above all, on downplaying surrogates” creativity 
and political authority both as laborers and as prior mothers. I will also 
show how the majority of what passes for activist or political thinking on 
surrogacy ironically relies on truncated, technophobic apprehensions of 
capitalism, by which I mean an analysis which locates technology outside 
of the human body and outside of “nature”, attributing to it the responsi-
bility for (often gendered) forms of violence. Making mainstream sense of 
the practice of surrogacy also relies on a capitalist framework of reproduc-
tive normativity, which the surrogate—standing as she does both at the 
center of the conceptual cleavages mentioned above, and at the end point 
of a racialized, gendered, globalized process of neoliberal capital produc-
tion—is a particularly well-suited fi gure to challenge. 
 For the purposes of this chapter, politics has been taken to mean the 
ensemble of practices which in some way aim at the composition of collec-
tively livable life. When I speak of the potential for an affi rmative surrogacy 
politics, I do not mean a juridical, legislative, bioethical or even analytic 
response to the facts of surrogacy. Rather, an affi rmative surrogacy politics 
is the project of imagining a mode of collective, autonomous social regen-
eration, and appropriating, to that end, the technological means of doing 
“assisted gestation” (and—more broadly—care). Certainly, demands (e.g. 
for regulation) levied at the level of states, and transnational juridical bodies 
may become a fi rst port of call for a struggle from below toward a way of 
enacting reproductive assistance that is both inherently just, and justly dis-
tributed. Here, however, an “affi rmative surrogacy politics” points less at 
the pursuit of regulatory mechanisms and more at the self- organization of 
gestating together with others. I propose a normative pursuit of the condi-
tions of possibility for ordinary people’s collective and purposive reinven-
tion of the mode of making children and, by extension, the world. These 
conditions of possibility are here suspected to include discursive interven-
tions such as the recasting of surrogacy clinics as gestational workplaces 
(e.g. Lewis  2016 ). 
 REINTRODUCING BABY GAMMY 
 The profi le of marketized gestational surrogacy skyrocketed in 2014 when 
the case of “Baby Gammy” caught the attention of a global public. Today, 
Gammy is a child living in Thailand with Down Syndrome, while his twin, 
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a so-called “healthy” girl named Pipah, resides in Australia (Marks  2015 ). 
In late 2013, Pipah’s now-parents, the Farnells (a heterosexual Australian 
couple), commercially commissioned the pregnancy that gave issue to 
the twins. In so doing, they joined the many Australian tourists who had 
sought the pool of affective, sexual, or otherwise-reproductive labors that 
had been cheaply available in Thailand until the military coup the following 
year abrogated their fl ow. The Farnells’ decision to hire a Thai surrogate 
echoed another, also geographically uneven, dynamic. Some onlookers 
speculated about the parallel informal intimate economy suggested by the 
couple’s mere appearance (he is white, and she a Chinese-Australian). Sure 
enough,  The Daily Mail unearthed evidence that David Farnell used a 
“mail-order bride” website to arrange the marriage in Jinxing. The woman 
later proved to be infertile, hence the turn to a California-based agency, 
Thailand-Surrogacy.Net, for further—biological—reproductive assistance. 
That visible sign, captured by the paparazzi, of an already-racialized char-
acter to Mr. Farnell’s appropriation of reproductive supports throughout 
his life could only heighten the drama of villainization that erupted when 
Baby Gammy was “abandoned” (Marks  2015 ) in Thailand. 
 The martyred saint or “Mother Courage” within the tale was the 
surrogate employee of Thailand-Surrogacy, a young woman named 
Pattharamon Chanbua (Michael  2015 ). The multiple embryo transfer she 
underwent had resulted, as is common in commercial surrogacy, in the 
implantation of twins, which incurs a premium fee. Reportedly, late in the 
contract pregnancy, the Farnells were apprised by the clinic of the male 
fetal twin’s Trisomy 21 (Gammy also suffers a congenital heart condi-
tion), and sought a partial refund, requesting that that twin be aborted, 
but Chanbua refused this option. Though it is somewhat unclear what 
Thailand-Surrogacy’s position with regard to the late-term abortion was 
(disability is not recognized in Thailand as a legitimate ground for the 
procedure); another Australian couple at the time—who were infertile and 
desperate—claim to have received an email from the clinic that essentially 
offered them the disabled fetus for a fee (Hawley  2014 ). 
 While this evidence of “baby-selling” fueled several Australian TV fea-
tures, further details of the backstory included further factors with equal 
“shock value”. Mr. Farnell turned out to have a substantial criminal record 
of pedophilic abuse of girls, for which he had served an extended sen-
tence in prison. (It is worth noting that a family member, not govern-
ments, brought the latter angle to light.) Once the media had gained 
their  sensational arch-villain, then, Farnell swiftly became the symbol of an 
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egregious departure from surrogacy ethics and violation of implicit unspo-
ken norms governing the access to global care typically enjoyed by mar-
ried, propertied, heterosexual white men. Accordingly, it became standard 
for journalists to cast the turncoat commissioning father of Baby Gammy 
as an archetypal danger to women and girls and perfect enemy of the insti-
tution of the family. In sections of civil society, too, as the various petitions 
to “Save Baby Pipah” (from him) made clear, Farnell became the very 
embodiment of the danger against which the normative value of family 
had to be defended. 
 Farnell’s association with pedophilia detracted substantially from his 
embodiment of a particular approach toward begetting kin, whereby he 
had tacitly placed conditions on his future-oriented commitment to par-
ent the products of a specifi c gestation (an attitude that is arguably  not 
egregious, both within and without the overseas surrogacy industry). The 
brouhaha prompted myriad international calls for “regulation” of the sur-
rogacy industry: the  Sydney Morning Herald headline on August 10, 2014 
“Thai surrogate Baby Gammy is a victim of an unregulated world” was 
typical of these. Rarely was it noticed that Baby Gammy was also the  ben-
efi ciary of lack of regulation in the sense that, contracts having been easily 
voided, he could straightforwardly be integrated into the Chanbua family. 
Gammy was the catalyst for regulatory measures which, in turn, created 
unpleasant scenarios well into the following year. 
 Like many other babies, Gammy was brought forth amid a frantic and 
opaque touristic climate shaped by an ongoing military coup; in particular, 
a new regime directive on child traffi cking that immediately required com-
missioning parents to obtain previously unnecessary release forms from 
their surrogates (Holmes  2015 ; Rawlinson  2014 ). In early 2015, it was 
widely reported that Baby Gammy had prompted the state of Thailand 
to ban commercial surrogacy altogether (Australian Associated Press, 
20 February 2015). 1 However, a backlog of already initiated gestational 
labors in Thailand resulted in an unhappy legislative endgame for transna-
tional for-profi t Thai surrogacy. For example, in July 2015, another couple 
was embroiled in a high-profi le confl ict over a contract brokered by the 
New Life clinic in Bangkok: the surrogate, having physically relinquished 
the baby, demanded it back, claiming she did not know the intended par-
ents were gay (Holmes  2015 ). 
 Chanbua, for her part, never pronounced on the main subject of 
concern for onlookers—the commissioning father’s sexual predilection 
and criminal past. From her perspective, the relevant events of 2014, in 
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a  nutshell, were that Gammy did not receive a lethal injection  in utero , 
but was born alive, side by side with his sister. Subsequently, the Farnells 
changed their mind about not wanting Gammy; yet Chanbua refused their 
about- face and made a counter-threat of reclaiming Pipah. Gammy fell 
to the care of the poorer, geographically peripheral, racially other—yet 
by popular accounts fi tter—putative parent. As such, the contradictions 
within the cry for regulation have been particularly glaring in this case. 
Although known as “Baby Gammy”, the more substantial controversy 
surrounded the part of the surrogacy transaction that could be said to 
have gone smoothly, namely, Baby Pipah. 
 More regulation in surrogacy does not necessarily entail straightfor-
ward enforceability; in Israel and the UK, extra rules seek to allow limited 
forms of diversion from the initial agreement in a surrogacy (subject to 
change in parties’ circumstances or, notably, the surrogate changing her 
mind). If a form of labor regulation were enforced removing all possible 
leeway around the devolution of custody following surrogacy, then, in 
this case, precisely the outcome that was popularly deemed unacceptable 
would have transpired: the ex-convict would have become enshrined as 
the parent of the male vulnerable twin also. However, the “unnatural” 
creation of kinin for-profi t clinics is easier to mediatize than is the crisis of 
the “normal” and “natural” family. Far harder to mobilize around is the 
everyday violence that falls outside the purview of surrogacy: that between 
fathers and daughters or men and more vulnerable members of families. 
 Symptomatically, in the discourse around Gammy, the exact loca-
tion of the perceived wrong was elusive, and non-specifi c to surrogacy. 
Implicitly it lay in the separation of the twins, the unsafety of Pipah in 
her Australian home and, simultaneously, in the relegation of the dis-
abled male to the care of the person who insisted he be born; yet, also, in 
Farnell’s presumption to procreate at all, that is, in the very origination 
of Pipah and Gammy, their very existence. Civil participants in the run-
ning commentary on Gammy—and the need for regulation he supposedly 
proved—rarely pronounced on how (for example) screening and barring 
a commissioning parent could be reconciled with the almost universally 
presumed “right to procreate”. Absent from this discussion, then, was any 
widespread sense that bigger questions were appearing on the table— is 
procreation an intrinsic good? to whom do babies belong? how should humans 
be reproduced? what counter-acts gendered forms of power?— that were far 
more daunting than the simple moral framework of regulatory failure and 
egregious transgression implied. Such questions touch on the relations of 
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the family  in toto , exceeding in scope the minor role of the new reproduc-
tive technologies therein. 
 Gross surrogacy mishaps are not uncommon. The prolonged moment 
of extreme interest in the Gammy story, then, must be imputed to a media-
genic confl uence of elements, including tangled markers of race, gender, 
and neocoloniality, but notably the specter of crisis at the heart of the fam-
ily—in the form of middle-class suburban pedophilia. For comparison, a 
contemporaneous surrogacy scandal of far greater magnitude, involving a 
non-white member of the international elite, maintained a consistently low 
profi le in the western media—its themes, though similar, proving less easily 
legible. Twenty-four-year-old Japanese business magnate and aspiring pol-
itician Mitsutoki Shigeta simultaneously employed at least 11 Thai surro-
gates with different agencies and was said to be envisioning these children 
as a future political voting bloc for himself (Rawlinson  2014 ). Shigeta, a 
single man, clinically fathered at least 16 babies in 2014: prompting a raid 
by Interpol, yet eliciting only surprisingly restricted debate about limits 
to the “right to procreate”. Reference to Shigeta serves in this context 
to contextualize Baby Gammy and indicate that his case was not the only 
available lightning rod for global concern around Thailand’s surrogacy 
industry, but rather, one whose characteristics were perhaps more likely to 
circumscribe the political questions it was able to generate. 
 RESPONSIBILITY AND “THE FAMILY” 
 Since biogenetics distanced Chanbua, and her pre-existing family, from 
Gammy, the decision to care for Gammy was more visible  as a decision . 
It generated belonging and “responsibility” in the sense vindicated by 
Donna Haraway of responsive attentiveness to a stranger, other or kin 
(Haraway  2011 ). Whether Gammy is “hers” or not was beside the point, 
in this view. As Haraway says on the theme of surrogacy, “The point 
for me … is  parenting , not  reproducing . Parenting is about caring for 
generations, one’s own or not; reproducing is about making more of 
oneself to populate the future, quite a different matter” ( 2011 ). Given 
that birth has typically been the marker of individual humans’ genealo-
gies and positions within families and racial hierarchies, the rise to promi-
nence of bodies-in-labor whose babies are  not racially continuous with 
themselves—nor kin—introduces new subversive potential to the scene 
of global reproduction. “The Surrogate remains a creature that nourishes 
indigestion” (Haraway  2011 ). 
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 Chanbua’s partner was evidently happy to become a surrogate  father , 
and he was not the only one in the extended Chanbua family to adopt this 
stance. Their embrace was not where Gammy had been intended to belong, 
despite his bodily continuity with Pattharamon’s body. Thus Gammy’s fame 
was that of a global pseudo-orphan, out of place. As the above photograph 
suggests, the perceived fragility of Baby Gammy—whose need for medical 
care inspired thousands of charitable donations—was derived in part from 
his relative whiteness, which emerged from the brown fl esh of an Asian 
woman and, by achieving high global visibility, could not but elicit anxiety 
in its apparent threat to the social construction of race. Pregnancy’s histori-
cally fraught yet unavoidable role in eugenic delineation and the policing of 
class property as well as race boundaries is well-documented in the canon of 
critical race theory, on which some of the most thoughtful contemporary 
theorists of reproductive technology fruitfully draw (Vora  2015 ; Rudrappa 
 2015 ; Banerjee  2014 ; Roberts  2009 ). The new race-critical and de-colo-
nial geographies of gestation, by heightening many of the contradictions 
that ideologies of “family” seek to resolve through pregnancy, offer fresh 
opportunity for a struggle over care. The starting point, to adapt a famous 
slogan of post-colonial insurgency and self-affi rmation, might be: “Your 
children are here because we are there”. 
 While Chanbua’s image was partially sanitized, her undertaking of 
responsibility for Farnell’s biogenetic property, deemed the defective 
by-product of her body’s work, was still a somewhat indigestible act. In 
performing it, Chanbua interpreted the gestational labor that she had per-
formed as a ground for an affi rmative politics she did not choose to couch 
in racial terms—though its freight was anti-racist. Foremost for her seem 
to have been qualitative questions to do with intimate care for disabled 
children, whereby the prerogative to mother him hinged on responsibility, 
more than race or genetics. Her narrative, in fact, introduced qualitative 
and tacitly political dimensions that complicated the dominant story of 
Gammy’s abandonment by his genetic proprietor(s). The BBC reported: 
“in an interview … Pattharamon Chanbua, 21, appeared to backtrack, say-
ing: “I did not allow Gammy to go back with them—that’s the truth. It is 
because they would have taken Gammy back and put him in an institute’” 
(11 August 2014). She also told the  Sydney Morning Herald : “I would like 
to tell Thai women—don’t get into this business as a surrogate. Don’t just 
think only for money—if something goes wrong no one will help us and 
the baby will be abandoned from society, then we have to take responsibil-
ity for that” (Murdoch  2014 ). 
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 Tantrums were triggered: at the scandal’s apex, the CEO of Thai 
Surrogacy, just one of many companies the Farnells could have used in 
or around Bangkok, alleged that his also-Chinese wife had yelled at Mrs. 
Farnell that “they must take responsibility for the baby” (Hawley  2014 ). 
Global opinion ruled, however uneasily, against Gammy’s best interests 
lying in Australia. Despite being visibly overwhelmed and to some extent 
drowned out by the media’s ventriloquism of her, Chanbua could—when 
pressed—articulate a logic, undergirding her sense of where, how, and with 
whom Gammy should live, which contained elements of a non- proprietary 
vision of parenting. Her stance evoked solidarity with the newborns against 
the individuals who had commissioned them into existence (by buying her 
embodied labor-power), a subversive twist on classical maternity. As such, 
she conveyed the germ of the possibility of determining carers and infants’ 
interests in common, instead of by exclusive reference to ownership and 
entitlement. In this, the reproductive  surrogate was also centering herself, 
the defi nitionally marginal or proxy fi gure, in the decision-making. 
 The fi gure of the renegade surrogate—who has ideas of her own about 
child-rearing, breaks the terms of her agreement with the commissioning 
parents, and can be imagined, at worst, absconding with the baby she car-
ried for other people—has presented a frightening challenge for the com-
mercial surrogacy industry ever since the disastrously public and litigious 
case of Baby M in New Jersey, which exclusively involved locals. In 1986, 
the surrogate Mary Beth Whitehead changed her mind and staked a claim 
as the  genetic mother (this practice of using the surrogate’s egg, called 
traditional surrogacy, was the norm for surrogacies at the time). Baby 
M divided both court and public opinion, even sparking a national anti- 
surrogacy movement (the National Coalition Against Surrogacy) which 
had international support (e.g. FINRRAGE, the Feminist International 
Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering; National 
Coalition Against Surrogacy). Almost 30 years later, commercial surro-
gates are typically  not members of the same community (or even nation) as 
clients. That parties occupy different class positions is tacitly written into 
the exchange of money for procreative labor-power. 2 
 The stark socioeconomic gulf separating the Farnells and the Chanbuas 
ensured that the “Gammy” arrangement resonated in many people’s minds 
in its immediate resemblance to sexual and domestic service labor markets 
in the Pacifi c that are predicated on extreme inequalities. Clinicians com-
bined Mr. Farnell’s sperm with anonymously donated oocytes, meaning 
that Pipah and Gammy did not bear any genetic material of the intended 
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mother, Wendy, any more than they did Chanbua’s. Thus, in signing up 
to bring the twins into being,  both women were undertaking care com-
mitments grounded in labor (gestating and parenting) rather than bioge-
netics. The unknown third had performed the “clinical labor” of donating 
her gametes. This intimation of a form of double or triple surrogation 
of Asian women’s reproductive labors—in Mr. Farnell’s home and fam-
ily life—rewards scrutiny. It epitomizes an economic trend that has been 
identifi ed by Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby as the deepening 
partitioning and marketization of certain bodily labors typically performed 
for free in the private domain (Cooper and Waldby  2014 ). 
 Noting this still leaves open, however, the question of the political pur-
port of this increase in commercially outsourced and waged social repro-
duction. It has been my contention that Chanbua provided germ of an 
answer, her words threatening more than just the conscience of would-be 
genetic parents everywhere who may—reasonably—experience anxiety as 
to whether the whiteness of European babies who emerge from waged 
wombs abroad is real (Gusmaroli  2015 ). Chanbua captured the dual char-
acter of care—as work and love—that was, for autonomist feminists, the 
source of its potential mass class power. According to the 1970s Italian 
exponents of the Wages For Housework (also termed Wages Against 
Housework) campaign, both the wage  and the demand for a wage could 
serve to make women’s so-called “labors of love” visible as work and form 
a common platform geared toward the collectivization of socially repro-
ductive life. Adapting the Wages Against Housework perspective, then, 
to contemporary surrogacy context, one might say: contract pregnancy 
or home pregnancy, “[e]very miscarriage is a work accident” (Federici 
 1975 ). 
 THE STAKES OF SEEING SURROGACY AS “JUST” GESTATION 
 Gestational labor cuts across boundaries defi ning work and non-work, or 
kinship and everyday living on the one hand and the professionalized bio-
medicine dealing in “life itself” on the other (more on the latter later). 
Gestation, refl ecting this internal dichotomy, becomes an oddly queer 
process when scrutinized closely, being both conscious and unconscious, 
labor and life, care and growth, nature and creativity, technology and fl esh, 
metabolism and art, and production and reproduction (Lewis  2015 ). An 
apt source of metaphors that sometimes obscure more than they reveal, 
gestation perversely straddles crucial conceptual cleavages: public/private; 
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intimate/economic; productive/reproductive; conscious/unconscious; 
imaginative/animal; creative/passive; intentional/unintentional; even, 
since the rise of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) in the late 1960s, hybrid/
organic and vital/artifi cial, human/nonhuman. Pregnancy is the site of 
enormous more-than-human power. As excitement about womb trans-
plants and technoutopian fantasies about ectogenetic incubators make 
clear, it is also the object of inestimable societal anxiety. 
 Presently, surrogacy functions as a domain separate from free, so-called 
“normal” gestation and motherhood, rather than as an extension of ges-
tation’s internal organization that refl ects back on that “natural” state of 
affairs. However, the very fact that it is the gestator, rather than the person 
who steps in to be the parent, that is indexed as “surrogate”, is wholly 
contingent on narratives of biogenetic property in the family, narratives 
that can be changed (Strathern  1992 ; Roberts  2009 ). Kalindi Vora is one 
of the few scholars who make the conceptual leap of looking at mother-
ing through the lens of surrogacy, rather than vice versa. For Vora, the 
productive character of the work of mothering ought to become “more 
visible when viewed through … commercial surrogacy” (Vora  2009 , 266). 
Certainly, the surrogacy/motherhood distinction is a powerful social con-
struction, but cases like Gammy’s show that it is only  contingently based 
on the factuality of a biomedical expert’s guarantee that one is making 
more of oneself (as verifi able by DNA testing). When needed, exceptions 
can be made in what makes something surrogate. The natural mother-
hood of a “gestational carrier” can be reinserted if, for example, the baby 
is unwanted: this cunning tactic of neoliberal society was the basis of 
Chanbua’s public anti-patriarchal complaint “no one will help us”. 
 Fundamentally, a surrogate, much like a wet nurse or nanny, is con-
tractually obliged to care for a child, yet prohibited from harboring any 
excess desire to care for it independently. Departure from that Janus-faced 
script has the potential to elicit censure and backlash; as can, paradoxically, 
adherence to it—where seamless service is interpreted as callous baby- 
selling. Chanbua’s public relations success presents suggestive indications 
about our society’s anxious arbitrage between surrogates who deserve 
pity or “rescue”. Gammy’s fate, in the public eye, fell between a victim-
ized brown woman and the predatory white pedophile who had not only 
“bought” Gammy, but also cast him aside. A vociferous assertion of the 
innocent surrogate’s status as mother arose within a briefl y viral campaign 
which invoked ostensibly contradictory tropes of saintly or heroic excep-
tionality, on the one hand, and a so-called natural mothering “instinct” on 
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the other. As this strangely bivalent response suggested, the job Chanbua 
performed was in one sense uniquely remarkable (as described above) and, 
in another, banally universal. Her motherhood was supposed to end with 
parturition, and instead, it began at that point, anew. As such, Gammy 
starkly embodied the disquieting possibility that newborns are  all aliens—
alienated products of gestational labor—who require conscious adop-
tion, reappropriation, and care upon their exit from their unity with the 
mother’s fl esh (Lewis  2015 ). In the neglected thought of philosopher and 
midwife Mary O’Brien,  all pregnancies contain this mix of singularity and 
generality, contingency, and historicity, through which gestators intrinsi-
cally exceed the bounds of “male-stream thought” (O’Brien  1981 , 30). 
 The terminology of the surrogacy industry is a suggestive fi eld for polit-
ical appropriations and  détournement by surrogate workers. For example—
as noted above—the term distinguishing itself against the 1980s praxis of 
traditional surrogacy is “gestational” surrogacy. With the latter method, 
the surrogate’s ova are not employed, such that the renegade surrogate 
can more easily recede in clients’ imaginations, not least because the racial 
frontiers and geographic distances between commissioning parents and 
the surrogate’s body have thereby been enhanced and securitized. Those 
whose bodies and whose labor have fulfi lled a given procreative purpose, 
however, can easily inconvenience this implicit logic with reference to 
both experience and science that defi es such borders. “It’s my blood even 
if their genes” said one surrogate interviewed (Pande 2015, 148). Indeed, 
cells pass in both directions between any given mother and her fetus; arti-
cles raising awareness of this phenomenon (called “micro-chimerism”) are 
increasingly prevalent (e.g. “A Pregnancy Souvenir: Cells That Are Not 
Your Own’,  New York Times , 10 September 2015). 
 Geopolitical anomalies such as Gammy bring to light this radically 
unromantic, unpretty, and unruly side to gestation. They point to the 
delusory nature of biogenetic securitization and to the potential limits 
of a global public’s acceptance of the discursive subordination of gesta-
tional laborers who are surrogated in the service of others. The ability of 
contemporary reproductive markets to endure multiple such challenges 
and exceptions may be weaker than it appears. The historical test of this 
would be the difference between intentional, conscious, and collective 
action by surrogates, and these isolated reactive moments. Through these 
briefl y available windows, when surrogacy becomes a controversy, it also 
becomes easier to see attempts at circumscribing the care politics that 
could erupt from this fi eld. To recall the delusional phrase used by an 
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English  commissioning parent (quoted in  The Daily Mail in 2012) of their 
Asian surrogate, the hope of those surrogating their reproduction is that: 
“she is just the vessel”. 3 
 REPRO-NORMATIVITY AND TECHNOCRACY 
 Capitalist biomedical technocracy, particularly in its highly gendered mani-
festation as above, presents a formidable barrier to apprehending the possi-
bility of self-directed, conscious, and collective gestation. The industry goes 
by the name “assisted reproductive technology” where, by being assimilated 
under the rubric of technology, the meaning of surrogacy can, theoreti-
cally, shed all traces of pain, mutual uncertainty, and messy relationality. It 
becomes a package of “reproductive care” delivering a clean technical solu-
tion to the pathology designated “infertility” (e.g. Wendy Farnell’s). 
 But this “technology” framing arises most decisively within the most 
value-extractive, slum gestational economies, which is to say, in so-called 
medical tourism and not so prominently in the UK, Israel, or the USA. For 
example, India has long provided the global middle class with one type of 
“tech support”, and today, it positions itself as the destination  par excel-
lence for medical troubleshooting as well, boasting prices that “democra-
tize” access to procreative assistance (Fixmer-Oraiz  2013 , 138). Indian 
surrogates themselves may conceptualize their activity as God-given and 
kinship-forming (see Vora  2015 , 120–128); but their managing clinicians 
do not. Inside the USA, by contrast, commercial surrogacy freelancers 
have established a quite different discursive arena in which the spiritual 
predominates over the technical, whereby they, as “surro-mamas”, can 
enjoy privileged status as powerful beings and honorary family members. 
To these surro-mamas” central and almost spiritual creativity, the medical 
technology appears as purely auxiliary (Berend  2012 ). This tells us that 
understandings of gestation are shaped, racialized, and malleable. 
 Another ideological barrier to surrogate politics is equally formi-
dable. In 2001, Katherine Franke coined the term “repro-normativity” 
to describe the social forces that incentivize motherhood to the point of 
pathologizing women who live non-reproductive lives. Franke, making a 
plea for the cultural de-centering of reproduction for its own sake, wrote: 
“the fact that the future of the species depends upon ongoing reproduc-
tion does not relieve us from devoting critical attention to the manners 
in which this biological demand becomes culturally organized” (Franke 
 2001 , 186). 
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 Why have a baby? Why ensure a baby is “one’s own”? It is remarkable 
that surrogacy’s public life— viz Gammy—frequently closes down, rather 
than opens up, questions about the fundamental assumptions structuring 
family intimacy and culturally organizing the very appetite for babies. Yet 
it is my contention that, in the fi eld of surrogacy scholarship, we have also 
proven for the most part reluctant to challenge the repro-normativity of 
the industry. This particular reluctance can be partly attributed to a pro-
gressive embrace of surrogacy’s affordance of genetic family ties to some 
people—Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transgender (LGBT), infertile, of post-
reproductive age, or otherwise reproductively non-normative—who had 
not been able to create them before. A critique of patrilineal attachment to 
guaranteed parentage seems to fall short in the face of a desire for “more of 
oneself” that is increasingly brought to the market by women and queers. 
Yet non-heterosexual clients still make up a minority of clientele in repro-
ductive markets, and if there is one thing the blissful imagery on surrogacy 
websites unfailingly communicates, it is uncritical promotion of biogenetic 
reproduction for its own sake. The infertility specialists tap the deep roots 
of repro-normative psychology as they whisper “ Don’t you want one? ” via a 
thousand websites. How can one argue with the birth of a baby? 
 What is a baby: a crutch, or a sort of project involving nurturing a help-
less stranger? Fetuses are  always genetically different from the bodies they 
inhabit; and for their part, grown bodies are not discriminatory about the 
embryos they will accept for uterine wall implantation. It follows from 
this little-explored reality that stressing the material continuity between 
surrogate and “straight” gestation makes a good de-mystifying strategy, 
a form of knowledge counter to the self-evident and naturalized certain-
ties of contemporary repro-tech. Performing an only semi-conscious yet 
fully creative labor, the surrogate worker manages the remarkable alchemy 
of growing an “alien” fetus insider herself (Majumdar  2014 ). Yet surro-
gates are rarely asked whether they also experienced their prior (“natural”) 
pregnancies as alien (Israeli practices are a notable exception cf. Teman 
 2009 ). In typical for-profi t surrogacy clinics, rules exist stating that the 
gestation must not be her fi rst (this “proves” prior fertility and suppos-
edly decreases the risk of counter-contractual bonding). The surrogate 
occupies the only truly authoritative position from which to judge the dis-
tinctiveness of the experience of bodily unity that links her with an “alien” 
rather than with kin. 
 The cyborg spectacle of a helpless squalling creature that is destined to 
become (for example) a white Australian citizen, yet is emerging from a 
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dark-skinned body in Thailand, is surely one of the clearest lenses through 
which to view the technonatural character of the human. The obvious 
artifi ce of surrogacy, together with the occasional baby on a “white” tra-
jectory who ends up staying with a brown family, shows the contingency 
of the human body’s naturalization and socialization within various global 
matrices of power and entitlement, belonging and otherness, and human-
ity and surplus. In order to be optimistic about the transformations that 
are possible here, one need not collude with the types of romanticization 
of the surrogate—often as a remote handmaiden fi gure, sometimes as ulti-
mate selfl ess mother—that is (usually) performed by grateful parents for 
whom a “surrogacy journey” has gone well. Reading the terrain of sur-
rogacy in a de-naturalizing and politicizing mode connects us, potentially, 
with the world beyond capitalist reproduction that some surrogacies allow 
us to glimpse. By questioning how different the stakes of “normal” or 
“straight” reproduction actually are, one can aim to assemble theoretical 
tools for a far broader politicization of social reproduction. 
 An affi rmative politics of surrogacy, simply by raising and making the 
embodied person of the surrogate  matter , is necessarily disruptive of the 
baby-centric, technocratic, and repro-normative organization of most ges-
tation today. Within present conditions of welfare retrenchment, austerity, 
and a resultant deepening of reproductive crisis, the unrecognized labor-
ers who are engaged in commercial and lay pregnancies alike could experi-
ment with a mothering strike, demanding “wages for pregnancy”, “wages 
for mothering” together. Such a politics would have to soberly confront 
the material parameters of the reproductive workplace, which are poten-
tially necropolitical. It would have to de-center the claims of both clinical 
bosses and genetic commissioners on the contents of the laborer’s uterus. 
Being able to contemplate the possibility of withdrawing the life-giving 
labor involved is as important as breaching contract by  refusing to termi-
nate pregnancy, as Pattharamon Chanbua did, on an occasion where it is 
the continuance of gestation that is against the other stakeholders’ wishes. 
 If every miscarriage is a workplace accident, every abortion is potentially 
a labor dispute. As we saw earlier, gestation and surrogacy are separated 
only by a name and a choreography, the external technological compo-
nents of any surrogacy process being merely IVF and embryo transfer: pro-
cedures which, in reality, are less sophisticated than methods commonly 
used in livestock agriculture. (Indeed, for some anti-repro-tech activists, 
the development of techniques on nonhumans in livestock breeding scan-
dalously revealed the dehumanizing eugenic agenda behind surrogacy.) 
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If mechanically inseminating a woman with gametes that were mixed in 
a Petri dish is technology, then so is cooked food (Haraway  1991 ). And 
so, by extension, are all of our bodies, which are best thought of not so 
much as discrete human selves but as cyborg hybrids, part machine and 
animal, that are hopelessly and liquidly inter-imbricated with our virtual 
and organic environments, helping sustain other “bodily natures” (Alaimo 
 2010 ). From this point of view, there is nothing normatively unpalatable 
in remarking that surrogates themselves co-constitute the embodied tech-
nology of baby-making. The technology is  us. 
 BEYOND TECHNOPHOBIC ANTI-SURROGACY “FEMINISMS” 
 For certain activists in the fi eld of surrogacy feminism, however, this 
technofeminist tendency has been anathema. Feminists of FINRRAGE 
founder Renate Klein”s persuasion have persistently deemed reproductive 
technologies to be tools necessarily wielded by the enemies of “women”. 
FINRRAGE commonly disseminated phrases like “Test-Tube Women” in 
the 1980s, by way of preface to the implicitly shocking question “What 
Future for Motherhood?”—as in the 1984 book by Klein. To them, the 
intrinsically degrading properties of IVF, embryo transfer and surrogacy 
would inevitably lead to these technologies being purposed—if left unchal-
lenged—toward the engineering of greater inequality and alienation for 
the global oppressed sex-class. The meaning of technology, to these fi g-
ures, was in almost all cases an unconscionable, masculinist colonization of 
life. As such they pitted their ideal of a female sisterhood “freely” exercis-
ing its biological autonomy against the deeply undesirable historic rise (as 
they perceived it) of “The Mother Machine” or “Man-Made Woman” (to 
paraphrase other popular book titles by FINRRAGE affi liate Gena Corea, 
published 1985, 1987). In the eyes of the network, it was in the power 
of “reproductive and genetic engineering [to] dismember, fragment, and 
dissect women into their body parts”—“reducing them to matter” (Klein 
 1991 :394). 
 Notwithstanding contemporaneous critiques of this understanding 
of matter—by Haraway, Sarah Franklin, and others—substantial surviv-
ing elements of this sensibility still circulate in the twenty-fi rst century. 
In the sphere of juridical and bioethical philosophy, proponents broadly 
within this trend ponder largely unhelpful questions, for example, “Is 
Women’s Labor a Commodity?” (Anderson  1990 )—the answer proposed 
is that it  ought not to be—or “Transnational gestational surrogacy: does 
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it  have to be exploitative?” (Kirby  2014 )—where exploitation is a moral 
concept rather than the name for any confrontation between capital and 
the wage—and so on. Ironically for a form of feminism, these positions 
are built fi rmly in a repro-normative framework, because they assume that 
gestating genetically unrelated embryos destined for  other communities is 
something women would not, could not, consent to do. 
 Continuing the infl uential early vein of anti-surrogacy thought, the 
strategic deployment of words like “machine”, “incubator”, and “oven” 
remains a standard way of vilifying surrogacy practices and exposing its 
supposedly inherently dehumanizing (“anti-woman”) logic. Calls to arms 
sometimes reprise the FINRRAGE perspective almost word for word: “It’s 
dehumanizing to be “an oven” for someone else’s baby” ( The Observer , 
9 May 2015); “a twisted version of slavery … . It devalues life” ( The 
Guardian , 4 August 2015). The 2015 inaugural press statement from the 
Stop Surrogacy Now network, which bears many FINNRAGE signatories 
and seems poised to replace FINRRAGE and revive anti-surrogacy femi-
nism, includes the quote “A woman is a human being, not a machine”. 
 Intuitive as this analysis can seem, it belongs to a broad tendency to 
truncate anti-capitalist thinking by regarding some forms of labor exploi-
tation as morally unique and deserving of elimination by any means 
(implicitly, from above). When operating as a form of feminism, this ten-
dency often targets certain intimate corporeal forms of work, notably, sex- 
work and surrogacy, identifying them as commodifi cation of the person, 
and calling for their abolition on that basis. Making an analogy between 
surrogacy and the sale of sex, both of whose anti-dignity implications are 
taken as read, forms the foundation of contemporary campaigner Kajsa 
Ekis Ekman’s perspective—as laid out in her book  Being and Being Bought 
(Ekman  2013 ). Ekman repeats the basis of Gena Corea’s denunciations of 
“reproductive brothels” in the 1980s, which had already echoed in myr-
iad other FINRRAGE-affi liated publications. What the gesture assumes is 
that metaphorically identifying commercial surrogacy with “reproductive 
prostitution” constitutes, not just an analytical, but a pre-evident  norma-
tive contribution in itself. 
 In other words, what it means economically and, by extension, politi-
cally, to work as a reproductive prostitute (beyond the bare fact that it 
is, in their view, very bad), remains unspecifi ed. The precise content of 
the difference between paid and unpaid forms of sexual and reproduc-
tive labor, for example, between “normal” and surrogated pregnancies, 
is left disappointingly uninterrogated in these analyses—as they are in the 
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 similarly technophobic ecofeminism of Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, 
which asserts that “reproductive technology alienates both men and 
women from their bodies” (Mies and Shiva  1993 , 141). Valuable as much 
of these players’ advocacy is on other fronts, their anti-commodifi cation 
stance rises to the defense of an essential, organic, unalienated (proposi-
tionally female) human body which can never exist and, in any case, does 
not emerge from an inquiry into paid reproducers” experience of their 
workplace. 
 Technophobic anti-surrogacy feminisms typically announce their oppo-
sition to “objectifi cation”, animated by the specter of the use of poor and 
working class women as “parts” and “breeders”. Unfortunately, however, 
this approach immediately falls into the reifi cation of surrogates itself—
this time in apolitical categories such as victimhood, martyrdom, or saint-
hood. The short-circuit stems from a common political failure, namely the 
partial inability to distinguish one’s rhetorical strategy from one’s applied 
analysis. A surrogate-led mobilization would not seek to “save” surro-
gates from their livelihood and, by centering surrogates, would necessarily 
require acceptance of the “cyborg” conditions of embodiment in which 
we are always already embroiled—this being a pre-condition for trans-
forming those conditions. 
 Strategically, anti-surrogacy activists isolate the—growing—marketized 
section of biological reproduction as their site of resistance and refusal. 
At this juncture, however, their distrust of technology leads them, even if 
unintentionally, to withhold a respectful, comradely, and solidarity-based 
politics from surrogacy workers. Contra to the politicization I wish to 
abet, their fl attened constituency (“women”) seems to underspecify who 
the subjects of this unlivable present are, who can fi ght to make it livable. 
On the terrain of surrogacy, the question should be: how will surrogates 
struggle? How will paid reproducers struggle in common with mothers, 
carers, and wives? But these are questions that are, for the most part, 
omitted. 
 Gestational contracts do involve a penetration that is capitalist: by rela-
tively powerful individuals, both materially and abstractly, deep into the 
body of a less powerful person. Unlike the cleaning contractors who sweep 
repro-tech clinics, or the migrant care-workers who may serve later as au 
pairs to the babies who are born in them, surrogates (who come from 
broadly the same marginalized classes as these) perform a labor that is 
“fully internal” to the value chains of the biomedical industry of fertil-
ity medicine (Cooper and Waldby  2014 , 9). Nevertheless, to rhetorically 
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identify a surrogate with an “oven” is too easy, in particular in the absence 
of any theorization of what she would  otherwise be (indeed, simultaneously 
is) in other (e.g. unwaged) spheres of life. It is therefore to deploy techno-
phobic scaremongering to shame those responsible for women “renting” 
their wombs—a group which includes the women themselves—thereby 
foreclosing politics that truly includes them. This subtly but perniciously 
patronizing epistemic orientation toward gestational labor sometimes 
rears its head more directly: for example, Ross-Sherriff considers it wor-
thy of note that studies were conducted using “standardized psychologi-
cal tests [and] found that … surrogate mothers in Great Britain and the 
United States were self-suffi cient, nonconformist, and independent think-
ers” (Ross-Sherriff  2012 ). Presumably, the intended audience expected 
something less from “reproductive prostitutes” and/or “ovens”. 
 The global divisions of labor that structure commissioning parents’ 
access to procreative assistance are unjust relations of bioavailability; by 
their very logic, they exploit and amplify a stratifi cation. Yet, the divi-
sion can only be thrown into question from a perspective that refrains 
from identifying the bodies of the bioavailable with the people in question 
and from determining those people’s best interests for them. Surrogates, 
in their own estimation—or so several ethnographies have found—work 
hard, physically and affectively (Pande 2015; Rudrappa  2015 ; Vora  2015 ). 
It is not without irony, then, that those who contemplate saving surrogates 
from their livelihood deny its status as work. In doing so, they become 
complicit in enabling the neoliberal, anti-political, technical framing of 
surrogacy on which the discreet and individuated channels of so-called 
“donor” economies depend. 
 De-stratifying reproduction implies refusing the sanctity of genetic 
property, as genetic property is the basis upon which intended par-
ents effectively own a part of the surrogate’s body and have the right 
to determine its fate. But de-stratifying reproduction implies above all 
a process of dispute, emanating from workers themselves whereby, if 
the  encroaching tide of commodifi cation of reproduction is denounced, 
then it is denounced because it erases the self-autonomy of bodies to an 
unacceptable degree, not on the basis of an exceptionalist argument that 
abstracting reproduction from all other social relations of work. 
 It is undesirable here to over-privilege gestational agency, for instance 
by inverting the gestationally passive—exclusively genetic—account pro-
moted by surrogacy clinicians for their customers’ benefi t. This would 
amount to participating in a reductive and, anyway, ultimately false 
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 authorship dispute over an infant (gene vs. gestator), which is hardly con-
ducive to an anti-proprietary and common reinvention of the “family”. 
The point in referencing the more-than-human, cyborgian surrogate, 
rather, has been to evoke a vision of mothering in which reproduction is 
vibrantly creative and alive, yet unromantic, unpretty, and de-centered in 
relation to other acts of mothering. The point has been to try to evacu-
ate the myth of normal or natural gestation from the conversation, along 
with the myth of a normal of natural human body that untouched by the 
scientifi c shibboleth we call “technology”. 
 Some not insignifi cant differences exist between the components of 
the labor performed by many present-day surrogates and other “nat-
urally” pregnant women around the world. While all pregnancies are 
subject to a matrix of technological and governmental involvement, sur-
rogates forfeit a greater degree of control, comply with a more rigid 
dietary discipline, and typically take up full-time residence within the 
clinical complex. At the same time, it bears spelling out, in the context 
of surrogacy discourses in which it seems taboo to say so, that the core of 
what takes place in surrogacy is no more nor less than human gestation. 
No more nor less technological, it is substantially the same thing. The 
gestating body, as we have seen, is not overly fussy about an embryo’s 
genetics because it is always already substantially “alien”. The aim in 
stressing this is to think through the consequences of that insistence 
from both the surrogates and non- surrogates” standpoint (one person 
very often unites both perspectives), and then to explore how such con-
sciousness can be generalized. 
 The distinctive feature of the surrogate-fetus nine-month presence in 
the worker’s anatomy is not so much its genetic difference as the fact that 
its path toward viability is progressively captured as profi table work. Profi t 
can be derived from the sale of individuals” gene actualization, but this 
depends heavily—at the level of symbolism—on a false guarantee that the 
buyer’s baby will  not emerge to greet them full of somebody else’s blood 
and guts. Yet, surrogacy being simple pregnancy, the baby always does 
greet you that way. After all, the surrogate’s placental surfaces are what 
 made the infant. The surrogate  stands in , both symbolically and materi-
ally, for an absent gestational capacity in other people. And the fi ction of 
surrogacy is that this connection is just as temporary as the disconnection 
(sitting out) of the surrogate from her  own family during the process. 
Surrogate-ness, then, is above all else a disavowed social relation, a surplus 
on which one can capitalize. 
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 CONCLUSION: IS “LIFE ITSELF” STRATEGIC? 
 Arguably the most common trope found in both promotional schmaltz 
and disciplinary apparatuses around surrogacy is  giving the gift of life . 
“Life” in this context evades defi nition even as its creation is enshrined as 
humanity’s ultimate, ineffable, supremely rewarding  raison d’être ; so the 
above discussion of repro-normativity also noted. The affordances of “the 
gift of life” have been amply explored, for instance by Pande with respect 
to “gifts for global sisters” (2015) and in the work of Heléna  Ragoné 
(2003) . 
 From here it is only a small step to the matter of Nikolas Rose’s infl uen-
tial monograph on biopolitics  The Politics of Life Itself (Rose  2007 ) which 
formed the starting point for Cooper and Waldby’s Marxian analysis. In the 
pages of  Clinical Labor , “life itself” is a material and mechanical substance 
undergirding the value-forms of the contemporary bioeconomy (Cooper 
and Waldby  2014 ). Theirs is a risky strategy because, within infertility 
medicine, and sometimes its attendant critical scholarship, its invocation 
serves only to mystify. When the commodity produced by surrogacy is 
referred to as this formidably de-politicizing substance “life itself”—and 
this may be spurred by a desire not to say babies—the effect can be to dis-
empower its makers and to resegregate them away from the other labors 
that sustain life-in-general, such as everyday housework. Rudrappa ( 2015 ) 
conjures the advent of “markets in life itself” while Vora’s analysis uncov-
ers fl ows of “vital energy” (Vora  2015 ). While neither analysis comes 
close to abstracting reproduction from other social relations, reference 
to vitality seems preferable to “life itself” in that it seems loosely quantifi -
able and thus more open to the qualitative transformations that forge our 
life-in-particular. 
 The professionally pregnant are, today, far from being positioned as 
experts on life’s production and distribution. In fact, where “life itself” is 
explicitly in play in the same context of the womb, politics risks disappear-
ing into a vortex of the arcane. Nathan Stormer argues convincingly that 
the dominant, sublime aesthetic within visualizations of gestation, which 
feature individuated human embryos fl oating as though in space, is a zone 
in which we have been trained to “look in wonder” at a “normal mira-
cle”—namely, the miracle of life itself (Stormer  2008 :667). In the face 
of “life itself”, none of us can be pragmatic, syndicalist gestators: rather, 
we are all more or less equally deprived of knowledge and wonderstruck, 
except perhaps for scientists. But this can change. As we have seen, it is 
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gestational laborers who produce the commonplace life and—contra- to 
repro-normative dogma—this need not inspire grandiose talk of miracle. 
Lives, rather than life itself, are what matter; lives are where suffering and 
struggle occur. Admittedly, there are scholars who declare themselves 
optimistic about a “politics of life itself”. 4 
 If “life itself” really possessed politically unifying power, then the poor, 
low-caste, and racialized communities where medical infertility is most 
prevalent, and the queer and trans communities where non- reproductivity 
is destiny, would be priorities within the cultural apparatus of assisted 
reproduction. Instead, historically, we fi nd assaults on these communi-
ties extending even to sterilization drives, and we see that allocations of 
subsidies for overcoming infertility are racialized in favor of whiteness—
particularly when mediated via the institution of marriage (Banerjee  2014 ; 
Roberts  2009 ). In contemporary society, “life itself” stubbornly persists 
in manifesting not as a leveling force but as a striated, highly hierarchized 
category, much akin to the falsely universal idea of the human. “Life itself” 
is most often invoked within individualistic discursive fi elds, for instance, 
when intended parents announce that they love or plan to love the child 
of their own “more than life itself”. 
 Whether most people love life very much is an open question, given the 
broadly abject, alienated, and immiserated condition of much existence in 
the twenty-fi rst century, in which having children so often seems like the 
only available solace. Despite the evident claims of LGBT people on the 
provision of state procreative infrastructure as a form of welfare, the really 
pressing project for progressive communities at this juncture is not the 
project of passing on life but that of determining to render life  in particu-
lar worth living. This endeavor is a very different matter to the preserva-
tion of life for its own, or indeed any individual’s, sake. 
 In her history of the body and primitive accumulation, Silvia Federici 
remarks that during the Renaissance “male doctors came to be seen as 
the true “givers of life” (as in the alchemical dreams of the Renaissance 
magicians)” (Federici  2004 , 89). An aftertaste of this legacy from the 
early modern professionalization of reproduction is still with us today. It 
is visible within surrogacy in the guise of a gene-centric technocracy that 
pretends experts are responsible for the gestational labors performed by 
women. Today’s doctors can “gift” the fruits of these labors away—for an 
enormous fee—to a privileged few whom science has alchemically certi-
fi ed to be the bona fi de parents in each case. Reproductive of life- itself, 
quietist toward concerns about life-in-particular, the innocent, discreet, 
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quasi-humanitarian world of infertility medicine structurally obstructs 
political contestations based around what surrogate workers actually  do . 
Its internal apparatus leverages transnational distance (Ikemoto  2015 ), 
and notions of biogenetic property, to segregate surrogate gestation from 
the concept of gestation simple. 
 A surrogates’ movement would be in a powerful position to begin to 
insist on some degree of negotiation and co-operation with regard to the 
construction of parentage more widely. It seems an exercise in utopianism 
to suggest that humans should adopt “their own” children as a matter of 
course or, put differently, that children should have to be adopted shortly 
after birth by whatever members of a community are collectively agreed to 
be best suited to the role—a choice which may not be biologically obvi-
ous. (In many respects, and in ways that become clearer through social 
histories of birth, what happens routinely to newborns  is a form of “adop-
tion”.) These are, however, serious questions that could be native to a fully 
fl edged politics of surrogacy. Conceivably, surrogates could lobby broker-
ing clinics to rule out the anonymity and distance of the “reproductive 
tourism” approach, thus gesturing at a model of more mutualist or com-
mon childcare. In short, a politics of surrogacy could take what surrogate 
workers do seriously. Furthermore, it should go without saying that the 
de-naturalization of reproductive geography’s gross unevenness is a task 
for every engaged scholar and onlooker, not only those who actually do 
the “assisting”. However, surrogates who show themselves ready to dis-
rupt and interrupt the terms, not to say the term, of outsourced gestation, 
despite the means of getting safe abortions residing in the hands of private 
experts, urgently require our support and solidarity. We are in no danger of 
running out of onlookers who will vocally characterize surrogacy transac-
tions as baby-milling, baby-googling, baby-selling, baby-brokering, baby-
farming, or indeed any combination of “baby” with a verb from the sphere 
of exchange. Like contemporary talk of “rent-a-wombs” and outcries about 
“test-tube babies” in the 1980s, such characterizations overwhelmingly fail 
to spell out the meat of their denunciation, which is merely implied by 
the neologism. The advancing frontier of commodifi cation elicits recoil; as 
though denying that the most precious things should be for sale changes 
the fact that—exploitatively, yet consensually—they are. 
 If politics from below is to occur in the fi eld of kinship production and, 
specifi cally, the biomedical industry of surrogacy, it shall be the  specifi c 
and situated forms life takes—in and outside the womb—that  matter. 
The question of consciously transforming the global mode of social 
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 reproduction, uninterrogated in surrogacy contracts, calls out to be ani-
mated and answered. What kind of lives should we collaboratively bring 
forth? How should we do so? Whose procreation needs and deserves 
assistance? How much emphasis should we place on having kids? Once 
we have evacuated the biomedical alchemists and their anti-political appa-
ratus of sentimentality from the (expanded) gestational workplace, ask-
ing such questions about the individual and collective life-forms that we 
want to reproduce—and those we want to refuse to reproduce—actually 
becomes possible. It is incumbent on anyone commenting on this fi eld 
to seek to determine how we could organize procreative assistance in 
such a way that de-privatizes procreation, centers the interests and the 
knowledge of gestational laborers, contests the uneven geographies of 
bioavailability, and undermines the global divisions of labor that stratify 
social reproduction. 
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 NOTES 
  1.  Anecdotal evidence pointed to a subsequent upsurge in reproduc-
tive tourism to Mexico (Parry  2015 ). 
  2.  Available evidence suggests it is more common in  non- commercial 
(or “altruistic”) surrogacy for all parties to be members of the same 
local geographic, religious, racial, ethnic, or national grouping. 
  3.  Octavia Orchard, a commissioning parent quoted in  The Daily Mail , 
“Our rent-a-womb child from an Indian baby farm”, 31 August 
2012. 
  4.  Notably, Rosi Braidotti, in “The Politics of “Life Itself” and New 
Ways of Dying” in  New Materialisms , ed. Diana Coole and Samantha 
Frost. Duke University Press, 2010. 
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